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Abstract 
This paper employs combined critical discourse analysis/ membership categorization 
analysis to examine social representations of peace that appear within two UK talk radio 
debates about terrorism. After an initial overview of how and where social 
representations of peace feature throughout the data, three extended sequences of talk 
are subject to detailed discursive analysis.  Whilst a range of Muslim and non-Muslim 
callers participate in these debates, analysis identifies that it is only Muslim speakers who 
engage social representations of peace. Analysis of three differing elite Muslim speakers 
reveals that in these debates: (i) peace is positioned as central to Muslim identity but 
also as a common value that is accessible to non-Muslims and Muslims alike; (ii) 
upholding and maintaining peace and challenging violent ideologies is constructed as an 
ongoing moral duty for Muslim communities; (iii) upholding peace as core to Islam does 
not mandate an absolute rejection of all violence in all contexts.  These findings are 
discussed in the context of mainstream UK terrorism discourse where Muslim category 
membership and adherence to Islam is routinely linked to concerns regarding the 
presumed threat of extremist terror attacks in the UK. 
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Introduction 
This paper examines how and when social representations of peace are occasioned 
within two talk radio debates in which speakers are addressing concerns with 
contemporary terrorism in the UK. It further analyzes the internal characteristics of the 
given social representations and considers how these representations serve as 
communicative resources for speakers during terrorism talk.  The paper begins by 
introducing social representations theory (Moscovici, 2008), before reviewing relevant 
prior literature and emphasizing the importance of identity for social representations. 
The benefits of adopting a discursive approach to enable a detailed study of social 
representations of peace are then outlined and a discourse analysis is presented which 
examines a small number of social representations of peace as they feature in these UK 
talk radio debates about terrorism. These findings are discussed within the context of 
contemporary terrorism discourse. 
 
Social representations theory 
Social Representations Theory (Moscovici, 2008) fundamentally asserts that individuals 
and groups are continually and actively engaged in the production and communication of 
shared social knowledge. Social representations provide a ͞way of acquiring and 
communicating knowledge, a way that creates realities and common sense͟ (Moscovici, 
1981, p. 186). The central function of social representations is to facilitate groups and 
communities in arriving at everyday ways of understanding the world. Jovchelovitch 
(2007) maintains that representations simultaneously act across societal and 
iŶteƌpeƌsoŶal leǀels, suĐh that soĐial ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ ͞relates to the construction of 
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ǁoƌldǀieǁs, to the estaďlishŵeŶt of systeŵs of eǀeƌyday kŶoǁledge͟ aŶd ͞aĐtiǀely 
express projeĐts aŶd ideŶtities of soĐial aĐtoƌs aŶd the iŶteƌƌelatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ theŵ͟ (p. 
12). Hence, social representations involve more than a passive development and 
transmission of knowledge, they are active phenomena which individuals are personally 
and socially invested in constructing and communicating during the cut and thrust of 
everyday interactions.  
 
The emphasis that social representations theory places on communication positions 
language centrally. Moscovici (2008) states that language and thought are wholly 
integrated in the production of shared social knowledge. Kilby (2015) asserts that social 
representations are ͞Đo-constructed, negotiated, dynamic forms of social knowledge that 
are powerfully realised through language and put to various use by members, both within 
and between groups͟ (pp. 231-232).  Forms of mass media therefore provide important 
vehicles for the proliferation of social representations. (See Höijer, 2011 for discussion of 
social representations theory in media research). Social representations that find voice in 
mass media communications occupy a critical position in the development of shared 
social knowledge, providing widely shared forms of mundane truth. Hence, the study of 
social representations of peace that feature within UK national talk radio debates about 
contemporary terrorism allow some purchase on widely accessible social representations 
of peace that are occasioned and developed in the context of terrorism. 
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Social representations and peace  
Galtung (1985, 1996) distinguishes between negative and positive peace, maintaining 
that positive peace requires more than the absence of physical violence, it involves 
positive social interactions which build and sustain peace. Peace psychology generally 
accords with this distinction and asserts the importance of pursuing peace as something 
which is more than merely the absence of violent conflict (e.g., Christie, 2006; Sarrica & 
Wachelke, 2009; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2008; Wagner, 1988). However, within the area of 
social psychological peace research, where the current research is positioned, Vollhardt 
and Bilali (2008) suggest that whilst the concept of positive peace is largely accepted, 
there is limited work that examines it. The current research facilitates the study of 
positive peace by inductively enquiring how is peace constructed by people in a given 
social, political, historical context, and how might we understand peace as a resource 
that people draw upon to particular ends during social interaction. In addressing these 
concerns, we witness the social identities of actors come to the fore, as people situate 
themselves in the relevant contextual space, and develop social representations of peace 
that are fitting for them and for their interactional aims. 
 
When it comes to accounting for why people adopt differing perspectives and work to 
develop and maintain varying social representations whilst disputing others, wide 
ranging social representations research has demonstrated that identity is a critical factor 
(Duveen, 2001; Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher, 2011; Howarth, 2002, 2014; Moloney & 
Walker, 2007). Typically, social representations research concerned with peace has 
adopted a comparative approach, examining and comparing social representations of 
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peace with war and conflict. Whilst the current research specifically concerns itself with 
peace in the context of contemporary terrorism, the findings of this existing area of 
research are highly informative regarding social representations of peace, and offer 
insight regarding the relationship between peace and identity, hence it is reviewed here. 
Building upon prior studies that report relatively well-defined representations of war but 
limited or less stable representations of peace amongst various groups (e.g., Hakvoort & 
Oppenheimer, 1998; Orr, Sagi & Bar-On, 2000; Wagner, Valencia & Elejabarrieta, 1996), 
Sarrica and Contarello (2004) contend that social representations of peace and war are 
fundamentally linked to identities and social practices. Members directly involved in 
peace activism are thus anticipated to hold distinct representations of both war and 
peace. Comparing social ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of ͚peaĐe͛, ͚ǁaƌ͛, aŶd ͚ĐoŶfliĐt͛ ďetǁeeŶ peaĐe 
activists and non-activists, the authors report that activists construct peace as a more 
dynamic phenomenon, whilst non-activists construct a more static, objective concept. 
However, the clearest differences found between activists and non-activists relate to 
social representations of conflict. Activists viewed conflict in more positive terms and as 
a normative feature of achieving peace, whilst non-activists framed conflict in more 
negative terms, distinguishable from war only inasmuch as conflict is a more local 
interpersonal concept (Sarrica & Contarello, 2004). The authors argue that these findings 
evidence the significance of identity and social practices for the formation of social 
representations of peace.  
 
Subsequent research with peace activists found further evidence regarding the centrality 
of identity and social practices within social representations of peace and war (Sarrica, 
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2007). The representations held by these participants led Sarrica (2007) to report that 
peace is ͞ĐhaƌaĐteƌized ďy the pƌoŵiŶeŶĐe of iŶtƌapeƌsoŶal aŶd ƌelatioŶal aspeĐts […] 
Moreover, peace is described in positive terms and not only as the absence of negative 
behaviors͟ (p. 267). Sarrica and Wachelke (2009) examined representations of peace and 
war amongst Italian students and identified structured representations of both peace 
and war. However, representations of war were especially stable and could be 
categorized under the themes of 'experiences', 'objects' and 'causes of war', whereas 
peace was found to be a more abstract concept, related to emotions, experiences and 
symbolism.  The findings led the authors to reject common assumptions that social 
representations of peace and war are structurally organized as straightforward 
antonyms. Rather, they suggest, peace and war are ͞conceptions based on different 
themes͟ (Sarrica & Wachelke, 2009, p. 328). Van der Linden, Bizumic, Stubager and 
Mellon (2011) examined relationships between attitudes to peace and war, and between 
social representations of peace and war amongst participants from the United States and 
Denmark. They similarly rejected any simple dichotomy in the attitudes people hold 
toward peace and war and found that notions of peace were not strongly associated with 
the absence of violence.  Moreover, whilst participants from both nations represented 
peace in terms more aligned to positive peace than negative peace, dominant 
representations of peace were found to differ between these nations.  Van der Linden et 
al (2011) propose that the differences in representations of peace and war can be seen 
to reflect differences in national political culture which in turn relate to a ŶatioŶ͛s histoƌy 
of engagement with war. Thus, it is not only personal and group based identity, but also 
national and cultural identity which is seen to be relevant for social representations of 
peace. 
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Peace and conflict as labors of culture and nation 
As indicated above, the potential that a straightforward dichotomy might exist between 
peace and violent conflict is challenged by the findings of social representations 
researchers. Thus, space is created to explore how members who may be supportive of 
violent conflict, may simultaneously uphold values of peace and how they may 
potentially strive for peaceful ways of living, and vice versa.  This is reflected in the 
findings of Gibson (2011a) who undertook a discursive psychology analysis of British 
speakers involved in deďates aďout BƌitaiŶ͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ the IƌaƋ ǁaƌ. He ƌepoƌted 
that amongst speakers who strongly asserted a position which was broadly 'pro non-
war', were members simultaneously supporting UK military action in Iraq.  Such findings 
highlight the importance of studying how members themselves normatively engage with 
and reproduce social representations of peace and conflict. This focus on ŵeŵďeƌs͛ 
everyday use may be particularly important for alerting us to the ways in which 
representations of peace and war are bound up with political and national identity (Van 
der Linden et al, 2011), but also other aspects of group based identity including ethnicity 
and religion. As Hewer and Taylor (2007) point out, we need to recognize that culturally 
derived ideas about peace are just that. Via reference to culturally embedded 
representations of European histories of war and conflict, Hewer (2012) demonstrates 
how the same events of war are understood and experienced differently both between 
cultures but also within cultures across time, arguing that ͞representations generated by 
the culture thus serve to endorse the culture so that they are both source and recipient; 
and the circular nature of the process largely shields foundational assumptions and 
beliefs from test or challenge from within͟ ;p. ϰͿ.  He further maintains that that shared 
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cultural assumptions such as those that underpin notions of democracy, justice, human 
rights and war are ͞not universal truths, but moral positions founded upon knowledge, 
values and beliefs, all of which are linked to power͟ (Hewer, 2012, p. 4). 
 
In addition to the literature outlined above, a further body of work has identified that 
social representations of war occupy a position of global importance.  Based upon a 
range of studies which analyze extensive data amassed from many Eastern and Western 
nations, Liu and colleagues provide compelling evidence that war and conflict dominate 
global social representations of world history (Liu, 1999; Liu et al, 2005; Liu & Hilton, 
2005; Liu & László, 2007; Liu et al, 2009). Of particular interest for the current research, 
Liu et al (2009), reported that, alongside the two world wars, the September 11
th
, 2001 
terror attacks in the US were ranked by participants from a range of Western and Eastern 
nations as amongst the three most important events in world history. These findings 
appear even more striking given that the research did not include data from the US or 
the UK. Whether this can be read as evidence that terrorism occupies lay consciousness 
as a modern form of war, or whether war and terrorism are categorized as distinct forms 
of conflict is not clear, what is clear however is that concerns with contemporary 
terrorism in the West occupy a central position in global public consciousness alongside 
war. Hewer and Taylor (2007) contend that the study of terrorism is greatly advanced by 
examining the content of cultural worldviews and shared social beliefs. They further 
argue that, in the UK context, we need to be concerned with exploring the identity of 
British Muslims who often find themselves experiencing contradictory social 
representations from differing cultures. In the current research, examining UK media 
 9 
 
debates about terrorism where British Muslim speakers are participating, affords a 
valuable opportunity to examine these issues. 
 
Discourse and social representations of peace 
Dedaíc (2003) states that ͞The fragility of peace and the precipice of war seem to hang, 
as it were, on words and how we say them and how we hear them͟ ;p. ϳͿ, and whilst 
much of the social representations peace research has utilized survey or experimental 
methods, the importance of studying discursive constructions of peace has been strongly 
asserted by Gibson (2011a, 2011b). Outlining the need for critical discursive peace 
research, Gibson (2011b) aligns with Hewer and Taylor (2007), pointing out that 
mainstream peace psychology broadly perpetuates a highly individualistic approach to 
the study of peace and violence which underplays the significance of the shared social, 
historic and cultural foundations in which social representations thrive. The issue of 
shared thinking is key to social representations theory, which posits that rather than the 
product, or preserve of individual minds, social representations are fundamentally 
derived in and through the given social, cultural, historical context. (De Rosa, 2006; 
Voelklein & Howarth, 2005). The position adopted in this research echoes Gibson (2011a; 
2011b), and contends that discourse provides a central means through which members 
construct modes of understanding that serve to provide forms of agreement about what 
constitutes peace and violence, as well as enabling subtler distinctions including 
differentiation between forms of legitimate and non-legitimate politically oriented 
violence. In making his call for the advancement of critical discursive peace research, and 
highlighting the relative lack of research of this kind, Gibson (2011b) suggests ͞we might 
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be well advised to begin by scrutinising the very terms 'war' and 'peace' themselves. 
Rather than treating these as straightforward and transparent terms, it is instructive to 
explore when they are used, and what they are used to do͟ ;pϮϰϯͿ. This research pursues 
that ambition by examining how members actively work up and make use of social 
representations of peace within debates about terrorism. 
 
The current research 
This research seeks to contribute to an understanding of how cultures of peace might 
develop within the context of UK terrorism by examining how social representations of 
peace are used as culturally contingent resources by speakers during debates about 
terrorism.  Given the context of this research, this analysis offers some purchase on 
social representations of terrorism as well as peace. However, the focal aim is the study 
of peace, and the data is selected solely to enable the study of how social 
representations of peace feature in the context of terrorism talk. The research questions 
are defined as: (i) who talks for peace in public debates about terrorism; (ii) what is the 
structural context and narrative content of their peace talk; (iii) (how) does the 
peace/violence dialectic feature within the talk. 
Methodology 
Discursive psychology is a well recognized and increasingly prominent approach, 
particularly within European Social Psychology, and within peace psychology there is 
indication that discursive approaches are beginning to make a contribution (E.g. 
Bretherton & Law, 2015; Gibson, 2011a, 2011b). Whilst the social constructionist 
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ontological and epistemological underpinnings of discursive psychology render it apart 
from more mainstream social psychology approaches where empiricism is judged by the 
use of familiar quantitative methods, and where statistical findings are the benchmark by 
which analytic claims are judged, discursive psychology is no less analytically rigorous. 
Whilst it typically coheres with a more relativist position which does not seek, or make 
claims to any kind of absolute or objective truth, it remains a grounded scientific 
undertaking and, particularly for those working in the realms of conversation analysis 
and membership categorization analysis, the analytic method is highly empirical 
(Wetherell, 2001). This typically necessitates the inclusion of large data extracts such that 
"the claims of the analyst are open to test by the reader or other researchers on the basis 
of the data" (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; 5). The potential contribution that discursive 
psychology can make to peace psychology is emphasized in the review paper by 
Vollhardt & Bilali (2008) who contend that social psychological peace research should 
seek to undertake more contextual research where peace is studied in people's everyday 
real world contexts  and away from the confines of laboratory settings. Moreover, they 
point to the need for multiple levels of analysis within peace research which rejects both 
'methodological individualism' and 'methodological holism'  and instead engages a range 
of methods in the pursuit of knowledge which helps us understand the complex relations 
that often exist between differing levels of analysis . With this in mind the current 
research proceeds. 
Data 
The data comprise two, hour-long programs that aired following two terror related 
events in the UK. The first, eŶtitled ͚What ŵoƌe ĐaŶ ǁe do to stop the teƌƌoƌists?͛ ǁas 
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broadcast on Monday 2
nd
 July 2007 and the seĐoŶd, eŶtitled ͚Why do soŵe Bƌitish 
Musliŵs ǁaŶt to ďloǁ us up?͛ aiƌed oŶ Fƌiday ϮϮnd February 2013. Both were broadcast 
by BBC Radio 5 live, a British national radio station devoted to live news and current 
affairs broadcasting. These two shows featured in a regular weekday morning slot which 
is devoted to live debate and generally concentrates upon a pre-selected current affairs 
topic or dominant news story. Both shows feature talk from the host, alongside 
contributions from pre-selected ͚elite͛ callers chosen due to some degree of topic-
relevant expertise, and everyday ͚lay͛ Đalleƌs.  
 
The data was transcribed in full and treated as a single dataset. In this sense, it is helpful 
to view the research as a single case analysis which facilitates detailed purchase on how 
peace is constructed by a small number of speakers engaged in terrorism talk designed 
for a public audience. As the specific interest is with social representations of peace, all 
appearances of ͚peaĐe͛ ǁeƌe Đoded using the Microsoft Word ͚fiŶd͛ faĐility. This equated 
to a total of six occasions. It is unsurprising that peace appeared relatively infrequently in 
debates that were directly addressing concerns with terrorism. Rather than diminish the 
study, it is perhaps even more crucial to examine how and where peace does feature, in 
the pursuit of knowledge which might begin to facilitate peace having a greater stake in 
such discourses. A subset of sizeable extracts, where each extract encompassed all talk 
related to the deployment of the ǁoƌd ͚peaĐe͛ were collated for analysis.  Analysis was 
strongly influenced by the body of work concerned with the study of talk radio (e.g., 
Fitzgerald & Housley, 2002; Hutchby, 1992a; 1992b; 1996; 1999; 2001; 2006; Kilby & 
Horowitz, 2013; Thornborrow, 2001a; 2001b; Thornborrow & Fitzgerald 2002), and the 
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central concern with identity foĐused the aŶalysis toǁaƌd speakeƌs͛ membership 
category work.  
 
Membership categories 
Originally developed by Harvey Sacks (1995), membership categorization analysis, is 
concerned with studying how membership categories are invoked by speakers during 
conversation, and how the invocation of a given membership category enables and/or 
requires speakers attend to certain category rights and obligations during the interaction. 
Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008) describe membership categories as ͞ĐultuƌallǇ aǀailaďle 
resources which allow us to describe, identify or make reference to other people or to 
ouƌselǀes͟ (p. 35). They further point out that one of the key features of membership 
categories is that there are always multiple membership categories that might be 
invoked by the speaker to categorise self or others. For example, in the context of the 
current paper, a speaker might be categorised, or self-categorise according to gender, 
ethnicity, religion, location, profession, or age. What is of interest here is which 
categories are invoked, and what interactional work might the given categories entail 
and/or achieve in the local context of the talk. Jayyusi (1984) demonstrates that 
membership categories have moral qualities which can reduce or remove the need for 
actions to be explicitly accounted for by speakers, as actions are often ͚Đategoƌy ďouŶd͛ 
(e.g., participation in illegal activity is routinely bound to the category ͚ĐƌiŵiŶal͛Ϳ. 
Subsequent work has examined additional category related properties such as 
knowledge, rights and obligations. All such category related properties are commonly 
ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚Đategoƌy pƌediĐates͛ ;Hesteƌ, ϭϵϵϴͿ. Furthermore, the study of 
membership categories as resources for the local accomplishment of social organisation 
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facilitates the analysis of talk as morally grounded practice (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2002; 
2009; Jayyusi, 1984), and as an environment where relations of power play out (Kilby & 
Horowitz, 2013). 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
Analysis afforded insight regarding (i) who speaks peace; (ii) why they speak peace; (iii) 
how they speak peace. Who relates directly to salient categories of identity that are 
identifiable for speakers who introduce peace; why is explored by examining common 
features of the talk which can be seen to stimulate the introduction of peace, and how 
involves analysis of the dominant narrative themes that members realize when 
developing social representations. An overview of key findings which outline (i) who and 
(ii) why is presented, subsequently analysis of data extracts examines how social 
representations of peace are discursively constituted and how they act as resources 
within this terrorism talk.  
 
In addressing the question of who talks for peace, the most striking finding relates to 
ethnic religious identity. The normative structure of talk radio introductions has been 
studied in detail elsewhere (Fitzgerald & Housley, 2002; Kilby & Horowitz, 2013; 
Thornborrow, 2001b). Kilby and Horowitz (2013, p. 733) report various established 
͞name plus͟ provisions that hosts use to introduce lay and elite callers to the air. The 
current research similarly identifies that a typical ͚Ŷaŵe plus͛ structure for lay caller 
introductions includes forename and location (͞We got John in Birmingham; Abdul in 
Leicester͟), and elite caller introductions comprise forename, surname and some 
indication of professional position or expertise linked to the topic at hand (͞Jahan 
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Mahmood is with us, er works with young Muslim men in Birmingham on anti-
radicalization pƌojeĐts͟). 
 
Schegloff (1972) highlights that when names and location details are provided, listeners 
inspect them as potentially revelatory regarding matters of class, sex and ethnicity. The 
institutional norms of talk radio introductions offer just such a site in which routinely 
disclosed information can be heard as indicative of ethnic category membership (Kilby & 
Horowitz, 2013). In this sense a lay Đalleƌ͛s ͚Đall ƌeleǀaŶt ideŶtity͛ aŶd theiƌ ͚topiĐ ƌeleǀaŶt 
ideŶtity͛ ĐaŶ poteŶtially ďlur. (See Fitzgerald & Housley (2002) for detailed discussion of 
the flow of talk radio identity categorization practices). In the context of terrorism talk in 
the United Kingdom where Muslim members are regularly treated as a suspect and 
daŶgeƌous ͚otheƌ͛, and conflations between Muslim identity and terrorist identity are 
commonplace, (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012; Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2009; Pantazis & 
Pemberton, 2009), ͚Abdul in Leicester͛ is not only routinely presumed Muslim, but his 
Muslim category membership is implicitly relevant for his contribution to the debate. In 
the case of elite introductions, the provision of caller ethnicity indicated by name and 
location ͚Jahan Mahmood from Birmingham͛ is coupled with explicitly stated professional 
credentials, namely [Jahan] ͞ǁoƌks ǁith ǇouŶg Musliŵ ŵeŶ͟ oŶ ͞anti-radicalization 
projects͟. Thus, call relevant identity is doubly bound to Muslim category membership.  
Implicit indication of Muslim identity, is a regular feature of caller introductions in the 
current data, and, as subsequent analysis will reflect, Muslim identity is routinely treated 
by all parties as relevant to the contributions these callers might go on to offer. However, 
the primary concern of the current paper is not simply that Muslim identity is treated as 
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relevant in this terrorism talk. Rather, it is the discovery that, whilst the speakers in these 
debates can be divided reasonably evenly between Muslim and non-Musliŵ ͚Ŷaŵe plus͛ 
introductions, on all but one occasion, peace is introduced solely by Muslim speakers. On 
the single occasion where peace is introduced by a non-Muslim speaker, it is the host 
who does so. In this instance the host responds to arguments made by a prior caller, 
maintaining that ͞theƌe’s a ďig diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ŵodeƌate peaceful Muslim people of 
whom there are millions in this country and nutters who go around plaŶtiŶg ďoŵďs͟.  
Thus, even on the occasion where a non-Muslim speaker introduces peace, he does so in 
the construction of Muslim identity. Finding that, within this UK terrorism talk, peace is 
voiced almost exclusively by Muslim members, stands stark against the backdrop of 
widespread, contemporary terrorism discourse which constructs British Muslims as a 
risky and suspect community (Mythen et al, 2009; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009), and 
where Islam is repeatedly conjoined with the concept of fundamentalism, such that 
'Islamic fundamentalism' refers to an ideology discursively positioned as a centrally 
motivating factor underpinning acts of terrorism against the UK and the West (see 
GuŶŶiŶg & JaĐksoŶ, ϮϬϭϭ; JaĐksoŶ ϮϬϬϳ, foƌ ĐƌitiƋue of ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ disĐouƌses of ͚IslaŵiĐ 
Teƌƌoƌisŵ͛Ϳ, leading to an increasing securitization of Muslim communities (Hussain & 
Bagguley, 2012).  
 
The discovery that peace talk is primarily the achievement of Muslim speakers within 
these debates is further developed by examining where in the talk peace is introduced. 
Evaluation of the local context enables some initial appraisal of why peace is deemed by 
speakers to be relevant at particular junctures. Analysis revealed that, on every occasion, 
peace is introduced in response to prior constructions of Islam and /or Muslim identity 
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advanced by non-Muslim speakers. Alongside non-Muslim callers, the host regularly 
introduces Islam and concerns with Muslim members as relevant topics for discussion 
and directs Muslim callers to respond to such concerns, ("I think you wanted to help us 
out with this question that was raised by an earlier caller on this programme. Whether all 
Muslim people in this country want this to be a Muslim state?").  Such forthright, yet 
seemingly uncontroversial requests indicate a routine acceptance by all participants that 
Islam can, and should, be rightfully debated as a central topic within the realm of 
contemporary UK terrorism talk.  Muslim speakers are not found to reject such 
positioning of Islam or their Muslim identity, however they are often seen striving to re-
construct the dominant representation of Islam and/or Muslim identity that is presented 
to them, and it is here that peace is drawn into view.  
 
Furthermore, on every occasion that social representations of peace are developed, they 
are constructed in and through reference to Islam and/or Muslim identity.  There is no 
other representation of peace developed by these speakers, either one which positions 
British or Western identity as core to the representation, or one in which peace is 
constructed as a facet of a speaker͛s personal identity. On each occasion, the social 
representation of peace is solely concerned with Muslim identity and Islamic values.  
Hence, whilst these initial findings lend further support to the argument that social 
representations of peace are forcefully bound up with aspects of identity, they differ 
from prior research that has reported on the significance of national political identity for 
representations of peace (e.g., Van der Linden et al, 2011).  Given that prior research has 
indicated that ethnic and religious identity is of central importance in historical 
representations of nations and nationhood (László & Ehmann, 2013; Liu & László, 2007; 
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Liu & Hilton, 2005), the current findings compliment the findings of Van der Linden et al 
(2011), highlighting ethnic and religious identity as complexly interwoven with national 
political identity within representations of peace.  
 
Having outlined who talks for peace, and provided some initial indication of when and 
why peace becomes relevant in these debates, analysis now turns to data extracts to 
further examine the discursive characteristics of these social representations, and 
consider the local context of the talk in which peace is deemed to be relevant.  As 
discussed above, Muslim speakers introduce peace on five of the six total occasions. It is 
also notable that on four of those occasions, peace is introduced by speakers who have 
been accorded some level of elite or expert Muslim status. This might be indicative of the 
potentially differing objectives of lay and elite callers on talk radio. Elite callers are 
typically pre-invited to participate and often seek to shape the agenda of the debate, 
whereas lay callers phone in whilst the show is airing and are therefore more typically 
responding to the focal concerns of the talk.  However, given there is only a single 
instance of a lay caller referring to peace, it is not feasible here to meaningfully explore 
potential differences between lay and elite social representations of peace. In total, 
three extended extracts of three differing elite Muslim speakers are analyzed below. Of 
the three instances not analyzed, the host occasioning of peace and the Muslim lay caller 
occasioning of peace have been excluded. Initial analysis identified that one elite Muslim 
speaker introduces peace on two separate occasions, however these two instances 
reflect comparable themes of social representation, hence, for reasons of space, only 
one instance from this speaker is examined. These three lengthy extracts reflect the 
varied features of social representations of peace that were engaged by elite British 
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Muslim speakers in these debates. In keeping with social representations theory, it is 
important to re-state that social representations do not operate at the level of the 
individual, when members construct and communicate social representations they are 
drawing upon and contributing to widely accessible forms of shared social knowledge. 
Hence analysis of these extracts facilitates an exploration of peace as a shared social 
construct that elite British Muslim speakers occasion to undertake particular 
interactional business in the context of terrorism talk. 
 
In the preamble to the first extract the caller is introduced by the host as ͞the 
spokespeƌsoŶ foƌ the Musliŵ assoĐiatioŶ of BƌitaiŶ iŶ “ĐotlaŶd͟, credentials which furnish 
the caller with a level of elite expertise to speak on behalf of a Muslim community (see 
Kilby & Horowitz 2013; Thornborrow 2001b for work on elite credentials). The caller is 
then asked by the host to address the issue of ͞ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot all Musliŵs iŶ this country 
ǁaŶt BƌitaiŶ to ďeĐoŵe a Musliŵ state͟. In response, the caller firmly rejects this 
proposition before outlining calls for dialogue between varied communities about what 
kind of society people might aspire to. The extract below picks up directly following this 
initial action-opposition sequence (Hutchby, 2006, 1996). 
 
 
Extract 1 
 
Host:  so what you’re saying is there are quite large numbers of Muslim’s who 1 
would like to see the introduction of some kind of Sharia law in this 2 
country 3 
O.S: no uhm just by choice uhm we already have many aspects of Sharia law 4 
in this country. I’m married by Sharia, I’ve got a Sharia compliant bank 5 
account, and sometimes people go over the top when you talk about 6 
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Sharia because there’s just minor aspects of your life your looking to live 7 
in a more godly fashion but people just associate it with chopping off 8 
hands and so on 9 
Host: and they’re wrong to do that are they? 10 
O.S: Yeah I mean it’s, y’know, in fact, many so called Muslim states around 11 
the world have got a wrong conception of Sharia, they think y’know just 12 
by having these arbitrary punishments that they somehow are living a 13 
more, running a more Islamic country, when in fact y’know this isn’t Islam 14 
at all y’know, the religion of soul, of peace, of godliness that we all want 15 
to see 16 
 
At the start of this extract the host packages his question as a refoƌŵulatioŶ of Đalleƌ͛s 
own prior contribution ͞so ǁhat Ǉou’ƌe saǇiŶg is theƌe aƌe Ƌuite laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs of 
Musliŵ’s ǁho ǁould like to see the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of soŵe kiŶd of “haƌia laǁ iŶ this 
country͟ (lines 1-3). The caller has in fact made no mention of Sharia law, however the 
power relations between host and caller, make the reformulation difficult to strenuously 
refute without appearing either antagonistic, or self-contradictory. (c.f. Fitzgerald & 
Housley, 2002; Kilby & Horowitz, 2013; Thornborrow, 2001a for discussion of omni-
relevance and host/caller relations of power). The caller responds with an initial rejection 
of the claim before turning the debate toward a discussion of Sharia itself which prefaces 
the notion of choice, ͞no, uhm just by choice uhm, we already have many aspects of 
Sharia law in this country (lines 4-5). He goes on to develop an account whereby Muslims 
who seek to live in accordance with Sharia are already able to do so, thereby 
downgrading any potential need for British society to change in order for Muslim 
members to uphold these values should they want to. In developing this response, via 
use of the pronoun ͚ǁe͛, the caller shifts footing (Goffman, 1979), moving from a position 
of speaking for Muslims in his capacity as spokesperson, to speaking as a Muslim. 
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Explicitly affiliating as a Muslim in this manner further advances the Đalleƌ͛s personal 
membership credentials which in turn invokes the moral rights and responsibilities 
associated with membership of the category Muslim.  Speaking as and for Muslim 
members in this way potentially affords an increased moral right to be heard on the 
matters at hand.  
 
Billig (1995) points out that ǁoƌds suĐh as ͚ǁe͛, ͚I aŶd ͚you͛ aƌe deiĐtiĐ utteƌaŶĐes.  Deictic 
words are words where the semantic meaning remains fixed but the referent varies 
according to the context of use.  Billig (1995) refers to deixis as ͞a foƌŵ of ƌhetoƌiĐal 
poiŶtiŶg͟ ;p. ϭϬϲͿ, ǁheƌeiŶ the full ŵeaŶiŶg is always context dependent. The use of 
deixis throughout extract 1, and particularly the shifts between the person pronouns 
͚we͛, ͚I͛, ͚you͛, ͚your͛, ͚they͛, are complex. They reflect a blurring of varying membership 
categories that resists an assumptive treatment of Muslim/non-Muslim membership 
Đategoƌies as aŶ ͚us aŶd theŵ͛ staŶdaƌdized ƌelatioŶal paiƌ ;Đ.f Leudaƌ Marsland & 
Nekvapil 2004). In repeatedly shifting pronouns, the speaker constructs alignment and 
potential overlap between some categories, whilst also drawing attention to the 
potential for categories to subdivide and thereby problematize the use of overly inclusive 
membership categories. Following initial reference to ͞we͟ ;liŶe 4) and ͞I͟ ;liŶe 5) which 
implicitly presents the caller as Muslim, he moves to introduce and challenge a 
representation of Sharia in which ͞sometimes people go oǀeƌ the top͟ (line 6). Common 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ǁhiĐh uŶdeƌlie this ͚oǀeƌ the top͛ ƌeaĐtioŶ aƌe pƌeeŵptiǀely addƌessed ďy the 
caller as he highlights that ͞theƌe’s just ŵiŶoƌ aspeĐts of Ǉouƌ life Ǉouƌ lookiŶg to liǀe iŶ a 
more godly fashion͟ (lines 7-8). Thus, the distance between Sharia and non-Sharia ways 
of life is minimized.  Presenting a non-specific contrast between what ͚people͛ think and 
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the implied reality of Sharia enables the caller to avoid confrontation with any particular 
membership category and retain emphasis on the positives of Sharia itself.  However, the 
non-specific use of ͚people͛ is contrasted with the use of the person pronouns ͚you͛ and 
͚your͛ which serve both to personalize this account, and to present followers of Sharia as 
a potentially inclusive category, which extends beyond the speaker, such that it is treated 
as normative that you could be living your life in this way irrespective of who you might 
be.   
 
The catch-all ͚people͛ is again used as the caller offers a contrast between the 
construction of Sharia in which members seek to ͞live in a more godly fashion͟ (line 8), 
and a view of Sharia in which ͞people just associate it with chopping off hands and so on͟ 
(lines 8-9). At this juncture, the host intervenes with a request for clarification. In asking 
͞and theǇ’ƌe ǁƌoŶg to do that aƌe theǇ?͟ (line 10) the host maintains a position where 
suĐh a ǀieǁ that ͚people͛ aƌe Đlaiŵed to hold could, in principle, be correct.  Note 
however, that neither host nor caller have yet offered any indication as to who is 
potentially holding such views. In offering a response which affirms that such a view of 
Sharia is iŶdeed ͚ǁƌoŶg͛, the Đalleƌ ďƌiŶgs iŶto ƋuestioŶ the Musliŵ ĐƌedeŶtials of ͞many 
so called Muslim states around the world͟ who hold a ͞wrong conception of Sharia͟ (lines 
11-12). Here then we see caller construct a conflict, not between Muslim and non-
Muslim members based on acceptance or rejection of Sharia per se, but one which pits 
Muslim against Muslim along the lines of incompatible representations of Islam. The 
caller comprehensively rejects the ideology of those who ͞thiŶk Ǉ’kŶoǁ just ďǇ haǀiŶg 
these arbitrary punishments that they somehow are living a more, running a more Islamic 
country͟ (lines 12-14,) and as we witness the pƌoŶouŶs shift agaiŶ, the ͚so-called Muslim 
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states͛ iŶ ƋuestioŶ aƌe Đleaƌly distinguished as ͚they͛. Hence, forms of punishment in the 
name of Sharia become a benchmark by which correct adherence to Islam can be 
evaluated, and members who endorse such violence are outside of the categories to 
which ͚I͛ and ͚you͛ might belong. In doing so the caller makes the case that, whilst 
Muslim members might seek to uphold the values of Sharia, they also categorically reject 
the use of random or capricious violence which stands in fundamental contradiction to 
Islam.  As the speaker puts it ͞Ǉ’kŶoǁ this isŶ’t Islaŵ at all͟ (line 15).  
 
Having developed an account which rejects arbitrary violence as incompatible with Islam, 
the caller concludes his turn by positioning Islam as ͞the religion of soul, of peace, of 
godliness that we all want to see͟ (lines 15-16). Here then, peace is introduced toward 
the end of the callers turn, within a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) alongside soul and 
godliness. All three virtues are positioned as core to Islam, thereby driving a social 
representation of peace where peace is fundamentally embedded within Islamic ideology 
and thus, integral to Muslim identity.  However, in building this representation, the 
person pronouns shift once again as the caller refers to 'we all', a category to which, 
theoretically, everyone can belong. Coupled with the caller's prior work aligning Muslim 
and non-Muslim members through a rejection of violence, a representation is developed 
in which Muslims and non-Muslims alike can be reasonably expected to share agreement 
upon the claim being made. I.e. ͚eǀeƌyďody ǁaŶts to see peaĐe͛. As ǁith the Đalleƌ͛s 
earlier use of the person pro-noun ͚your͛, reference to ͚we͛ blurs the boundaries 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and focuses upon common values that are shared 
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by members of a common society. In this way, the caller can represent Islam as the 
religion of peace and represent peace as a set of shared values accessible to all. 
 
In sum, extract one reflects the host undertaking varied membership category work, 
drawing upon the normative affordances of his role, the host pursues controversy 
(Hutchby, 1992a), which serves to position the caller and hold him to account over 
Muslim ways of life. For his own part, the caller invokes a range of entitlements, both as 
an elite speaker, and as a Muslim member to uphold and defend Islam against widely 
circulating discourses which serve to divide Muslim from non-Muslim along lines of 
presumed ideological incompatibility between Islam and Western democratic norms and 
values (Said, 1997; 1978). Membership categories are repeatedly blurred in developing 
an account where fears around Sharia are de-escalated and peace is positioned as central 
to Islam and thereby Muslim identity. Furthermore, Muslim and non-Muslim members 
are brought together via a presumption of the more broadly shared values of peace and 
love. 
Analysis now moves to consider how peace is brought to bear in relation to an issue that 
is repeatedly seen within the dataset whereby Muslim communities are positioned as 
having a moral duty to police the ways in which all Muslim members seek to represent 
the fundamentals of Islamic ideology. Extract 2 is the culmination of an extended turn of 
talk by an elite Muslim caller that articulates an unequivocal challenge to ͞radical 
preachers who preach ǀioleŶĐe͟ and maintains that such individuals should be publicly 
confronted. Extract 2 picks up as the caller approaches the end of his turn of talk.   
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Extract 2 
U.H:  Muslim communities have to stand up, the congregation have to reclaim 1 
the mosque and say quite openly we do not want divisive extremist 2 
messages of hate. We come to the mosque to the love of God and to 3 
attain him at peace, and we don’t want this constant anger about erm 4 
world events which you know will always continue, and faith should 5 
provide a tranquil approach to these things and not one which reinforces 6 
the anger narrative  7 
 
In demanding that ͞Muslim communities have to stand up, the congregation have to 
reclaim the mosque͟ (lines 1-2) we see Muslim members constructed as a collective, who 
can be expected to demonstrate unity along the lines of Muslim category membership. A 
moral duty is then discharged which mandates that this group regain control over 
Muslim places of worship. This call to 'reclaim the mosque' constructs the mosque as 
currently lost to the Muslim community, and the need to reclaim it implies that it is 
ĐuƌƌeŶtly uŶdeƌ the Đlaiŵ of aŶ ͚otheƌ͛, as opposed to merely being an empty place to 
which Muslims should return. Given the callers stated concerns with ͚ƌadiĐal pƌeaĐheƌs͛, 
a reading is premised which implicitly but categorically distinguishes between ͚Muslim 
ĐoŵŵuŶities͛ who are referred to as 'we', aŶd ͚ƌadiĐal Islaŵ͛. Moreover, the demand 
that Musliŵ͛s ͚staŶd up͛ implies a current level of Muslim submission in the face of this 
radical aggressor. Via the use of the person pronoun 'we', the Muslim caller then moves 
on to reject ͞diǀisiǀe eǆtƌeŵist ŵessages of hate͟ (lines 1-2Ϳ ĐalliŶg upoŶ otheƌ Musliŵ͛s 
to ͞Ƌuite opeŶlǇ͟ (line 2) do the same. As in extract 1, a clear division within the 
membership category Muslim is constructed along the lines of adherence to particular 
readings of Islam, with radical Islam positioned as anathema to Muslim communities. In 
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contrast to extract 1 which flagged a rejection of physical violence, extract 2 rejects 
negative emotions and violent ideologies as counter to Islam.  An alternative 
representation of Islamic religious practice is then offered whereby ͞we come to the 
mosque to the love of God and to attain him at peace͟ (lines 3-4).  Like extract 1, peace is 
introduced sequentially Đlose to ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚God͛, and positioned as a cornerstone of 
Islamic faith. It is through this representation that the physical and structural violence 
associated with radical Islam is rejected. 
 
So far analysis has served to demonstrate how in the current data: (i) Islam is routinely 
treated both as relevant, and as an accountable matter for Muslims during terrorism talk; 
(ii) Peace is constructed as core to Islam and thus to Muslim identity, (iii) Muslim 
members are called upon to protect and defend Islam from ideological insurrection 
which challenges its peaceful fundaments  (iv) Via a blurring of membership categories, 
peace is represented as common value around which Muslim and non-Muslim members 
can cohere.  
The final extract enables a further close examination of the way in which these social 
representations of peace orient to, and position violence. The prior extracts have 
demonstrated a strong rejection of violence with respect to the normative values of 
Islam and specifically Sharia law (extract 1), and a rejection of hatred and disunity 
(extract 2).  However, as outlined earlier in this paper, peace and violence do not 
necessarily operate as antonyms (Sarrica &Wachelke, 2009), nor do social 
representations of peace inevitably mandate a complete rejection of violence (Van der 
Linden et al, 2011), and prior discursive research has indicated, how members can 
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uphold general values of peace whilst also demonstrating support for specific occasions 
of war (Gibson, 2011a). In the context of UK terrorism talk where contemporary and 
visceral acts of violence are routinely represented as being motivated by ͚IslaŵiĐ 
fuŶdaŵeŶtalisŵ͛ and where conflations between Muslim identity and terrorist identity 
are commonplace, positioning peace in relation to violence might be particularly 
challenging for Muslim members without leaving themselves vulnerable to charges of 
extremism or terrorism sympathies. The following extract reflects how a caller works to 
maintain a representation in which peace is integral to Islamic values and Muslim identity 
whilst simultaneously refusing to categorically denounce all forms of violence.  
 
We join this extended sequence between an elite Muslim caller and the show host as the 
caller seeks to build a response to the host formulation of the Quƌ͛aŶ whereby ͞people 
alǁaǇs poiŶt to the ďit ǁheƌe it saǇs ǁheƌeǀeƌ Ǉou fiŶd the iŶfidel slaǇ theŵ͟. In making 
use of the open meŵďeƌship Đategoƌy ͚people͛, the host Ŷot oŶly aǀoids personal 
ownership of the controversial proposition, but also avoids any explicit reference to who 
these 'people' might be. However, in the context of these debates, and given that 
adherence to the Quƌ͛aŶ is an unassailable aspect of Islamic faith and therefore integral 
to Musliŵ ideŶtity, the ͚people͛ ǁho seeŵiŶgly ƌaise ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout the Quƌ͛aŶ are 
constructed as non-Muslim. In his initial response, the caller sets out a positon which 
seeks to debate this issue in accordance with the literal text of the Quƌ͛aŶ. Space 
restrictions preclude presentation of the entire exchange, but suffice to say, during the 
early turns, the caller offers direct quotations of the Quƌ͛aŶ, and stresses a clear contrast 
ďetǁeeŶ ͚offeŶsiǀe͛ aŶd ͚defeŶsiǀe͛ foƌŵs of ǀioleŶĐe.  
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Extract 3 
JM this is a defensive war when you’re caught on the back foot right, this is 1 
not an offensive no way does it say in that verse that you can blow yourself 2 
up or kill innocent people 3 
NC Yes but if a preacher, if a wicked preacher teaching hate can say look it is 4 
a defensive war because our people are being killed by drones, hey fellas 5 
it’s a defensive war 6 
JM Yeah but look 7 
NC Hey look all I’m saying to you is you can see how the message is getting 8 
mangled can’t you? 9 
JM No but any message could be mangled, it just takes an idiot to mangle it, 10 
someone with a, someone with a completely mangled brain in the first 11 
place is gonna turn peace into war, is gonna turn a defensive war into an 12 
offensive war, is going to turn something that in is in some cases sacred 13 
into taking the lives of innocent people. His own book, the same book that 14 
you’re saying he misinterpreted clearly states you cannot take innocent 15 
lives 16 
 
At the start of extract 3 the caller repeats his distinction between "defensive" and 
"offensive" war (lines 1-2) which is immediately followed by a strenuous rejection that 
there is any potential to inadvertently misinterpret this section of the Quƌ͛aŶ ͞no way 
does it say in that verse that you can blow yourself up or kill innocent people͟ (lines 2-3). 
The host interjects during this point (line 4), in a manner which is both sequentially 
interruptive and morally combative (Hutchby, 1992), and precedes to develop a 
representation of Muslim members, pursuing the possibility that category distinctions 
upheld by the speaker can fall victim to ideological manipulation " Yes but if a preacher, if 
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a wicked preacher teaching hate can say look it is a defensive war because our people are 
ďeiŶg killed ďǇ dƌoŶes, heǇ fellas it’s a defeŶsiǀe ǁaƌ͟ (lines 4-6). In the context of the 
wider debate where repeated reference has been made to Muslim religious 
spokespeople, and given the sequential appearance of the phrase 'wicked preacher', 
there is little doubt that the intended preacher is Muslim. Hence the host develops a 
representation which utilizes well-worn cultural depictions of evil (c.f. Edwards, 2004; 
Erjavec & Volcic, 2007; Leudar et al, 2004) to construct a mythical Muslim preacher who 
is represented as 'teaching hate'. Malevolent Muslim ideology is then presented as the 
motivation for blurring ideas between offensive and defensive wars. The host also 
distinguishes between Muslim and non-Muslim members with reference to "our people" 
who are "being killed by drones" (line 5) and in this context, 'our people' are implicitly 
constructed as Muslim.   
 
Alongside the negative representation of 'Muslim preachers', the attempt by the host to 
undermine the speaker and muddy the water between offensive and defensive wars is a 
wider and deeper argument which potentially cleaves Muslim and non-Muslim members 
apart. Following the rationale of the hypothetical position offered, the death of Muslims 
during drone attacks, is assumptively categorized as an action which should not merit 
any kind of 'defensive war' response. Hence dominant Western ideological and political 
sanctioning of drone attacks which kill Muslims are implicitly upheld, whilst any form of 
politically motivated violent response is positioned as being aŶ ͚offeŶsiǀe ǁaƌ͛ driven by a 
'wicked' interpretation of Islam.  
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The host then offers the air back to the speaker and requests affiliation with the 
proposition stating " Ǉou ĐaŶ see hoǁ the ŵessage is gettiŶg ŵaŶgled ĐaŶ’t Ǉou?" (lines 
8-9). The speaker does not affiliate but resists being drawn on the detail stating " No but 
any message could be mangled, it just takes an idiot to mangle it " (line 10). It is here, 
again as the caller is reaching the conclusion of his turn of talk, that peace appears. On 
this occasion the caller constructs a representation of peace via a series of contrasts 
whereby "someone with a, someone with a completely mangled brain in the first place is 
gonna turn peace into war, is gonna turn a defensive war into an offensive war, is going 
to turn something that in is in some cases sacred into taking the lives of innocent people" 
(lines 11-14). In this three-part list (Jefferson, 1990), the caller introduces 'peace' as a 
concept which is first contrasted with 'war', but then immediately followed by a second 
contrast between 'defensive war' and 'offensive war', and rounded off with a contrast 
between 'something sacred' and 'taking the lives of innocent people'. On one side of this 
peace/violence construct sits ͚peaĐe͛, ͚defeŶsiǀe ǁaƌ͛ aŶd ͚soŵethiŶg saĐƌed͛, ǁhilst oŶ 
the otheƌ lies ͚ǁaƌ͛, ͚offeŶsiǀe ǁaƌ͛, aŶd ͚takiŶg the liǀes of iŶŶoĐeŶt people͛.  Hence, in 
keeping with Gibson (2011a), this social representation of peace does not exclude all 
forms of violence, rather it distinguishes differing forms of violence according to what 
motivates it. Moreover, offensive violence in the name of Islam is treated as the province 
of irrational or warped individuals and rejected as entirely incompatible with Islam. 
 
Conclusion 
This research examines how members introduce and develop social representations of 
peace in terrorism talk. Analysis revealed that non-Muslim and Muslim members orient 
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to Muslim category membership, and to Islam as relevant concerns. Moreover, Islamic 
ideology and Muslim identity are routinely treated as accountable issues for Muslims. 
Crucially however, when peace features, it is almost exclusively introduced by Muslim 
speakers, and on every occasion, social representations of peace are developed through 
a focus on Muslim identity and Islamic ideology.  Analysis of extracts highlighted that 
these elite Muslim speakers not only positon peace as central to Muslim identity, but 
also treat peace as a core common value around which non-Muslims and Muslims can 
cohere. Upholding and maintaining peace, and rejecting radical ideologies is constructed 
as an ongoing duty for Muslim communities. However, positioning peace as core to Islam 
and to Muslim identity, is not seen to mandate a rejection of all forms of violence.  
Similar to the discovery that speakers in UK television debates simultaneously upheld 
general anti-war attitudes, whilst articulating specific support for Britain's involvement in 
the Iraq war (Gibson, 2011a), in the current analysis we witness Muslim speakers draw 
distinctions ďetǁeeŶ diffeƌiŶg foƌŵs of ͚offeŶsiǀe͛ aŶd ͚defeŶsiǀe͛ ǁaƌ suĐh that oŶe ĐaŶ 
ƌejeĐt ͚offeŶsiǀe͛ ǀioleŶĐe ďut ŵaiŶtaiŶ that oŶ soŵe oĐĐasioŶs ǀioleŶĐe is a necessary 
means of defense. 
 
What is striking in the current findings is the way in which these social representations of 
peace implicitly and explicitly challenge dominant UK terrorism discourse which positions 
Islamic ideology as a centrally motivating factor underlying the perceived ongoing threat 
of terrorism in the UK, and which constructs Muslim ŵeŵďeƌs as a daŶgeƌous ͚otheƌ͛ 
(e.g., Hussain & Bagguley, 2012; Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2009; Pantazis & Pemberton, 
2009). Whilst calls for tolerance toward the Muslim community regularly feature in 
mainstream UK media discourse, these calls routinely construct Muslim extremists as the 
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exception amongst British Muslim communities, an argument which does little to 
challenge widespread assumptions that terrorists are rooted in Muslim communities 
(Tsoukala, 2008), and perpetuates a ĐoŶflatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚teƌƌoƌist͛ aŶd ͚Musliŵ͛ Đategoƌy 
membership.   
 
Hewer and Taylor (2007) argue that, in contrast to social representations concerned with 
terrorism in Northern Ireland, or Israel, which draw upon linguistic distinctions between 
religious identity and political ambition (I.e. Catholicism/ Irish Republicanism; 
Judaism/Zionism), ͞there is currently no word or phrase in the English language to 
distinguish between the actions of politically motivated radical Islam and ordinary 
Muslims. In the world of labels and categories, they are all Muslims – all adherents of 
Islam͟ (p. 207).  The findings reported here maintain that, in the context of 
contemporary terrorism in the UK, this ͚ǁoƌld of laďels aŶd Đategoƌies͛ presents a serious 
challenge for Muslim members, and for wider society alike. Whilst there is increasing 
deployment of terms such as Islamic Fundamentalism, Radical Islam and Islamic 
Extremism in attempts to differentiate Muslim members according to their support or 
denouncement of particular ideological positions, such language does not offer robust 
categorical boundaries. These terms have a discursive potential to slide and merge, 
something which a participant in the current data exemplified with the statement ͞where 
does extremism start and end.͟ (See Ahmed (2003) for a detailed discussion of 
metonymical sticking and sliding in relation to Muslim identity and terrorism discourse).  
The current analysis reflects the ease with which a construction of Islam which rejects 
peace and promotes violence, can be mobilized. In this data, we witness repeated 
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instances of the host invoking such constructions for comment by Muslim speakers, this 
activity serves to emphasize divisions between non-Muslims and all Muslims in the UK 
along an illusory fault line of Western peace and Muslim violence. In endeavoring to 
combat this construction we witness elite British Muslim speakers introducing social 
representations of peace, such that peace itself acts to reject this damaging construction 
of Muslim identity and Islamic ideology, and offer an alternative to which all parties can 
coalesce.   
 
This paper presents a contextual study of social representations of peace as they feature 
in two, hour long UK talk radio debates about terrorism. Moreover, these findings relate 
only to elite British Muslim constructions of peace. (Although it should not be overlooked 
that non-Muslim speakers had equal footing in this talk and yet there were no instances, 
other than that of the host, in which non-Muslim speakers sought to occasion peace in 
these debates). The theoretical approach emphasizes the role of context for social 
representations, and the discursive method examines each facet of the social 
representation in fine detail, addressing the complex interweaving of peace and identity 
in the representation. This research does not make any claim regarding social 
representations of peace in other contexts, however, the current paper is not aware of 
any other research which examines social representations of peace in the context of 
contemporary UK debates about terrorism, or indeed any research which has applied 
discourse analysis to study this issue. Thus, this research affords an important insight 
regarding how peace is discursively constructed by elite British Muslim members in the 
context of terrorism talk.  The findings presented reflect that, in the given context, peace 
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is fundamental to Muslim Identity, and equally that Muslim identity is crucial to social 
representations of peace.  More than two decades ago, Cohen and Arnone (1988, p. 180) 
aƌgued that it ǁas esseŶtial foƌ those iŶǀolǀed iŶ ĐoŶfliĐt ƌesolutioŶ to ͞ƌeĐogŶize that for 
paƌties iŶ ĐoŶfliĐt, ideŶtity pƌeĐedes peaĐe as a ďasiĐ ǀalue͟. The hope of the current 
paper is that by exploring how peace is represented by members in their own terms and 
examining the role that identity plays in the construction of peace during terrorism talk, 
it is possible to develop an awareness of how these speakers talk for peace. Such 
understanding offers potential for shaping conversations of varying kinds both within and 
between differing communities, such that communities and societies seeking to counter 
terrorism and potentially other forms of conflict are more disposed to listen when peace 
talks.  
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